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Contracts 
by Robert G. M einers* 
Statute of Frauds 
When is one estopped to plead the statute of frauds? Cali-
fornia's complex and somewhat confusing view of this question 
again perplexed an appellate court in Tomlins v. The Ameri-
can Ins. Co. l To understand how the court met the problem 
two prior cases require review. 
In a leading case decided in 1909, Seymour v. Oelrichs,2 
the supreme court took the unique position that even without 
having misrepresented a fact, one might be estopped to plead 
the statute of frauds as a defense if he makes a representation 
going to the requirements of the statute. Thus, if one made 
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a representation that a wntmg was not necessary, that a 
writing would be executed or that the statute would not be 
used as a defense, he would thereafter be estopped from plead-
ing the statute as a defense. 
In a 1950 case, Monarco v. Lo Greco,3 in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Traynor this position was drastically changed. 
The rule announced in Monarco was that where either an 
unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment would result from 
a refusal by the court to enforce the oral contract, the doctrine 
of estoppel could be invoked whether or not plaintiff relied 
on a representation going to the requirements of the statute. 
The reasoning employed by the court in M onarco was that 
in reality it is not a representation going to the requirements 
of the statute that a person relies upon when he changes 
his position in reliance; it is the promise that the contract 
will be performed. 
In the recent Tomlins case the one-year clause of the statute 
of frauds (Civil Code § 1624) was involved. Plaintiff left 
his employment for another position from which he was dis-
charged one week thereafter. Plaintiff contended that he had 
a three-year contract. In the trial court the jury was instructed 
that the statute "does not apply where there have been repre-
sentations that a writing will be executed in the future or 
where an unconscionable injury would result from the refusal 
to enforce the contract.,,4 (Emphasis added.) On appeal, 
it was held that this instruction was erroneous because the 
use of the disjunctive "or" permitted the jury to find an estop-
pelon a "mere" promise to reduce the agreement to writing 
without any element of unconscionable injury to the plaintiff. 
The court pointed out that the test in Monarco was either 
unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment and that where 
either element exists the doctrine of estoppel may be applied. 
The court went on to say that in holding unjust enrichment 
to be sufficient to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, Monarco, 
" . necessarily implies that such a promise, alone [i.e. 
a representation going to the requirements of the statute] and 
3. 35 Cal.2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 4. 258 Cal. App.2d at 528, 66 Cal. 
(1950). Rptr. at 94. 
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without either unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment, 
will not suffice to establish an estoppel."5 
Another case involving the one-year clause was White 
Lightning Co. v. Wolfson. 6 Here, the oral agreement pro-
vided that Wolfson was to receive a certain weekly salary 
plus one percent of the annual gross sales of White exceeding 
one million dollars. This percentage was to be payable 
quarterly. Since the computation and payment for the last 
quarter would obviously take some time, it could be argued 
that the contract could not be performed within one year. 
The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Tobriner, pointed 
out that the California cases, in construing the one-year clause 
of the statute of frauds, have held that the statute applies 
only to contracts which, by their terms, cannot possibly be 
performed within one year. The court held that the provision 
making part of Wolfson's compensation dependent upon an 
analysis of yearly gross sales did not in itself convert the 
oral contract into one which by its terms could not be per-
formed within a year. The court's reasoning coincides with 
the position taken by the few courts in other jurisdictions 
passing on the same point. 
Illegality 
The problem of the contractor building a horne without a 
license was presented in Famous Builders, Inc. v. Bolin.7 
The court did not have to struggle with the problem of whether 
the statute requiring a license was intended for purposes of 
revenue (in which case the unlicensed plaintiff can usually 
recover) or protection of the public (in which case, recovery 
is usually denied). Section 7031 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code states explicitly that an unlicensed contractor 
cannot recover. In commenting on this section the court 
reviewed the recent supreme court decision in Latipac, Inc. 
v. Superior Court,S pointing out the severity of the statute 
5. 258 Cal. App.2d at 528, 66 Cal. 7. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 94. 17 (1968). 
6. 68 Cal.2d 336, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 8. 64 Ca1.2d 278, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676, 
438 P.2d 345 (1968). 411 P.2d 564 (1966). 
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and the forfeiture it necessarily entails. For these reasons 
the supreme court has been reluctant to construe the statute 
more broadly than necessary for the achievement of its mani-
fest purpose. However, factors in the Latipac case were not 
present in Famous Builders. The court said: 
In the Latipac case the contracting party, after the lapse 
of its license, actually later secured a license; here no 
later license was ever acquired. In the Latipac case one 
of those in charge of the work of the contracting corpo-
ration had been authorized by the board to act in similar 
work through a license granted to another business enter-
prise, but here no such license existed.9 
Sustaining the trial court's determination that the unlicensed 
contractor could recover, the appellate court pointed to fail-
ures, some of them wilful, on the part of the contractor as 
additional reasons for its holding. Although the contractor 
in this case did have a license when he began the work, his 
license expired before he had finished the work. Section 7031 
of the Business and Professions Code is explicit in requiring 
the contractor to be licensed "at all times during the perform-
ance of such act or contract." 
Another case involving a licensing violation was California 
Chicks, Inc. v. William Viebrock. 10 The statute in question 
was section 1263 of the Agricultural Code. Unlike the stat-
ute in Famous Builders, it is silent on the contractual effect 
to be given to a failure to secure a license. Section 1263 
simply provides that "no person shall act as a . . . dealer 
without having obtained a license." Plaintiff, the 
vendee of a contract for the purchase of eggs, brought an 
action against the defendant vendor for breach of contract. 
The trial court denied recovery because plaintiff did not have 
a produce dealer's license as required by section 1263. The 
appellate court reviewed the statutory sections involved and 
after an extensive discussion of the statutory licensing require-
ment concluded that the statute was intended for the protection 
9. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 70 Cal. 10. 254 Cal. App.2d 638, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. at 20. Rptr. 269 (1967). 
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of the pUblic. Accordingly, the unlicensed plaintiff was un-
able to recover. 
Frustration of Purpose 
Frustration of the purpose of a contract is well recognized 
as a defense to further performance of the contract. Com-
mercial frustration of purpose is codified in sections 1932 
and 1933 of the Civil Code. This doctrine has been extended 
to leasehold estates by the California courts but only where 
there is extreme hardship and total or nearly total destruction 
of a contemplated purpose of the contract by a fortuitous 
event that was not reasonably foreseeable by the parties when 
the contract was made. 
In Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverdell an action 
was brought to declare a sublease of realty unenforceable 
for the remaining months of the leasehold. Plaintiffs operated 
a trailer park on the leased premises. When a cesspool-septic 
tank on the property broke down, public authorities ordered 
them to connect the trailer park sewage system to the public 
sewers or vacate the trailer park and surrender their operat-
ing permit. Since the cost of connecting to the public sewage 
system would have been approximately $7,500.00, plaintiffs 
argued that the main value of the lease was destroyed. In 
upholding the lower court which denied relief to plaintiffs, 
the court pointed out that the doctrine of commercial frustra-
tion of purpose is based on the happening of a fortuitous 
event which a person cannot control or guard against in the 
exercise of due diligence. Plaintiffs did not fulfill this re-
quirement. Assuming that they had, the court then asserted 
that plaintiffs failed to show that the event was not forseeable 
to preclude "the inference that the risk was assumed.,,12 More-
over, plaintiffs did not sufficiently prove extreme hardship. 
11. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
132 (1968), hearing granted October 
23, 1968. 
36 
12. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. at 135, hearing granted October 
23, 1968. 
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Mistake 
The dividing line between unilateral mistake and mutual 
mistake was the subject of Schaefer v. Califoniia-Western 
States Life Ins. CO. 13 A father took out a "Junior Estate 
Builder" policy on his son. Subsequently, for an additional 
premium he took out additional coverage, known as payor 
insurance, whereby if he should die before the policy anni-
versary nearest his son's 25th birthday, premiums would be 
waived until that date. Through a clerical error on the part 
of the insurance company a different rider was stapled to the 
policy. This rider was used only on endowment type policies 
and had the effect of waiving all premiums after the father's 
death, not just those falling due before the policy anniversary 
date nearest the son's 25th birthday. 
The father died and the son contended that all premiums 
were thereby waived. The company disagreed. The son 
argued that the company's attachment of the wrong rider 
on the policy was a unilateral mistake and that there were 
consequently no grounds for granting reformation of the 
contract. The court disagreed. The court first pointed out 
that the father who purchased the policy was not the usual 
purchaser of insurance: he "was one of Cal-Western's most 
able and experienced sales agents [and] was thoroughly famil-
iar with the policies offered by the company . . ." .14 What 
then was the effect of the company attaching the wrong rider 
to the policy? In the court's opinion it was a mutual not a 
unilateral mistake: "Assuming, as we must, that when he 
received the policy with the additional rider requested, appel-
lant's father either did not read it or was mistaken as to its 
contents, he shared his mistake with that of the company.,,15 
Acceptance 
The problem of a subcontractor submitting a bid to a 
general contractor who thereafter remains silent was posed 
13. 262 Cal. App.2d -, 69 Cal. 15. 262 Cal. App.2d at -, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 183 (1968). Rptr. aU86. 
14. 262 Cal. App.2d at -, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 184. 
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in Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc. 16 Obvi-
ously, silence does not constitute acceptance, except perhaps 
where past dealings between the parties raise a duty on the 
part of the offeree to accept or reject the offer. Such was 
not in evidence here. However, plaintiff relied on an estoppel 
argument to the effect that defendant set in motion a set 
of circumstances which led plaintiff to reasonably believe that 
an acceptance had taken place. The court could find no 
estoppel since the defendant had no duty to speak. There 
was no previous dealing between the parties. 
Obviously, acceptance of a contract may be manifested by 
conduct as well as by words. The subcontractor argued that 
the general contractor had manifested his acceptance by list-
ing the subcontractor in the bid to the school district for 
the prime contract. Relying on a statute, the court rejected 
this contention. Section 4104 of the Government Code re-
quires listing the names of subcontractors. No contract be-
tween a general contractor and a subcontractor is created by 
mere compliance with this statutory requirement. 
A final argument by plaintiff was that he was entitled to 
enforceable contract rights not by virtue of his offer to the 
general contractor, which went unanswered, but as a third 
party donee beneficiary of the contract between the general 
contractor and the school district. The court, in rejecting this 
contention, referred to the same statute. This reference was 
apparently intended to go to the test which is most frequently 
employed in determining third party beneficiary rights. If 
the intent of the promisee is to confer a benefit upon the 
third person, he will qualify as a donee beneficiary and thus 
gain enforceable rights under the contract. Therefore, if the 
intent of the general contractor, as the promisee of the school 
district's promise to pay for the construction of school build-
ings, was to confer a benefit upon the subcontractors who 
submitted bids, the latter would be donee beneficiaries. The 
court found that plaintiff was, at most, an incidental bene-
16. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 809 (1968), hearing granted Sep-
tember 25, 1968. 
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ficiary. Only donee and creditor beneficiaries get enforceable 
rights: incidentals do not. 
Mental Competence 
In a case of first impression, Smalley v. Baker,17 dealing with 
manic depressive psychosis and its effect on contractual ca-
pacity, the court reviewed the California statutes and cases 
dealing with mental competence. Section 39 of the Civil 
Code states, "A conveyance or other contract of a person 
of unsound mind, but not entirely without understanding, 
made before his incapacity has been judicially determined, 
is subject to rescission . . . ." Section 39 concerns but 
one of three types of incompetency due to weakness of mind. 
The first is total weakness of mind which leaves a person 
entirely without understanding and renders him incapable of 
making a contract of any kind. This type of incapacity is 
set forth in section 3 8 of the Civil Code. The second is a 
lesser weakness of mind which does not leave a person entirely 
without understanding but destroys his capacity to make a 
contract and thus renders a contract subject to rescission. 
This type of incapacity is set forth in section 39 quoted above. 
A still lesser weakness of mind which provides sufficient 
grounds for rescission of a contract because of undue influ-
ence is set forth in Civil Code section 1575. Subdivision 2 
of that section provides that undue influence consists "in 
taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind." 
The court stated that since manic depressive psychosis is a 
mental illness, it is clearly a weakness of mind within the 
context of section 1575 of the Civil Code. Whether or not 
this form of psychosis is within the purview of section 39, 
which does not require undue influence, is another matter. 
The court pointed out that medical recognition of manic 
depressive psychosis did not occur until 1896. Civil Code 
section 39 was enacted in 1872, but most of the cases decided 
under it, formulating the test of contractual competency, took 
place after 1896. Smalley was a case of first impression 
since, before it, there were no California cases dealing with 
17. 262 Cal. App.2d -, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 521 (1968). 
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manic depressive psychosis with respect to contractual incom-
petency. After reviewing the nature of manic depressive 
psychosis and the California law dealing with incompetency, 
the court concluded that a person suffering from such a psy-
chosis is not incompetent under the traditional test of com-
petency set out in section 39. 
Exculpatory Clauses 
In Akin v. Business Title Corp./a plaintiff vendor had 
entered into an escrow agreement with defendant escrow 
company. Due to an error in recording a chattel mortgage 
its value was lost to plaintiff. He brought action and received 
judgment. 
On appeal, defendant urges the validity of an exculpatory 
clause contained in the escrow agreement. This clause would 
relieve defendant of any liability resulting from ordinary neg-
ligence. To support his argument defendant relied on a 1958 
supreme court decision, Simmons v. Bank of America/9 up-
holding the validity of an exculpatory clause and stating 
that contracts relieving individuals from their own ordinary 
negligence do not contravene public policy. Writing the 
opinion in Akin, a distinguished former law school dean, 
Justice Kingsley, indicated that Simmons is no longer to be 
considered controlling. 
Plaintiff relied on a more recent supreme court decision, 
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California. 20 In this 
case the court held an exculpatory clause invalid as against 
public policy on the ground that the clause was affected with 
a public interest. The court said that an exculpatory clause 
attempting to absolve a person from liability for negligence 
will be held invalid as affecting the public interest if it involves 
a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following 
characteristics: 
[ 1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought 
suitable for public regulation. [2] The party seeking 
18. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 20. 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 
Rptr. 287 (1968). 383 P.2d 441, 6 A.L.R.3d 693,(1963). 
19. 159 Cal. App.2d 566, 323 P.2d 
1043 (1958). 
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exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great 
importance to the public, which is often a matter of 
practical necessity for some members of the public. [3] 
The party holds himself out as willing to perform this 
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or 
at least for any member coming within certain established 
standards. [ 4] As a result of the essential nature of the 
service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the 
party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advan-
tage of bargaining strength against any member of the 
public who seeks his services. [5] In exercising a superior 
bargaining power the party confronts the public with 
a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and 
makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay addi-
tional reasonable fees and obtain protection against neg-
ligence. [6]: Finally, as a result of the transaction, the 
person or property of the purchaser is placed under the 
control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness 
by the seller or his agents.1 
After a comparison of the six criteria in Tunkl the court 
found that the transaction in this case was also one that 
"affects the public interest." Thus it would appear that the 
Tunkl test, originating in a case involving an exculpatory 
clause relieving the D.C.L.A. Medical Center from negligence 
will be extended to other areas. 
Construction of Contracts 
Performance Involving Personal Satisfaction 
What is meant by "underground"? Does it mean only under 
the surface of the earth or does it include gravel located under 
a concrete slab? And if the parties to a contract anticipate 
such disputes in interpretation, can the builder protect him-
self by inserting a clause whereby the contractor agrees to 
perform to the satisfaction of a certain architect? 
1. 60 Cal.2d at 98-101, 32 Cal. Rptr. 
at 37-38, 383 P.2d at 445-446, 6 
A.L.R.3d at 698-700. 
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These were the questions confronting the court in Walnut 
Creek Elec. v. Reynolds Constr. Co. 2 Plaintiff was an elec-
trical subcontractor on a school construction job. The plans 
and specifications called for wrapping of "all conduits installed 
underground." Plaintiff questioned the necessity of wrapping 
conduit pipes laid in gravel fill underneath the concrete slab 
of the building. He raised this matter with the architect for 
whom he had to perform "to satisfaction." After consulting 
the expert opinion of an electrical engineer employed by him 
as a consultant on the project, the architect asserted that 
wrapping was included in the specifications. Plaintiff did 
the wrapping under protest and billed defendant general con-
tractor for the amount involved. 
The trial court did not pass on the question of what "under-
ground" meant as set forth in this contract, but found that 
plaintiff had agreed to the finality of the architect's determi-
nation. On appeal, the court disagreed. It held that the 
word "underground" was ambiguous and that despite the 
clause in the contract whereby plaintiff agreed to do the work 
"according to the plans and specifications and to the full 
satisfaction of said Architect," the architect was not the final 
arbiter of this dispute. The court construed the above lan-
guage as giving the architect authority to decide on matters 
of quality and quantity of performance, not to render "a 
legal interpretation of the subcontract or to resolve ambiguities 
in the plans and specifications." 
It would appear that if one anticipates any differences 
of opinion as to what is called for in contractual plans 
and specifications, and wants a third party to be the final 
decision-maker, he had best include definite language. 
Arbitration 
Contracts containing clauses in which the parties agreed 
to submit disputes to arbitration were the subjects of three 
cases. In two cases one of the parties to the contract was 
resisting arbitration. In the third, the dispute had gone to 
2. 263 Cal. App.2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
667 (1968). 
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arbitration and the losing party sought to have the award set 
aside while the winner sought to have the award confirmed. 
In Bianco v. Superior Court,3 the contract contained the 
standard clause, "In the event that a dispute shall arise be-
tween the parties relating to this agreement, such dispute shall 
be submitted to arbitration . . . ". Plaintiffs filed a com-
plaint for rescission of the contract and for other relief. 
Defendant petitioned the court for an order compelling arbi-
tration, and the court granted his petition. On appeal, the 
order compelling arbitration was set aside. Section 1281.2 
of the Code of Civil Procedure contains two restrictions, 
one of which is that "grounds exist for the revocation of the 
agreement." The court discussed the statutory history of 
this provision and concluded that when such a petition is 
made, it is the duty of the court to determine whether or not 
grounds exist for revocation of the contract. This, the trial 
court failed to do when it issued its order compelling arbi-
tration. 
In A & E Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Company,4 the 
9th circuit reversed the district court's denial of an injunction 
against arbitration on the grounds that the lower court abused 
its discretion. The party resisting arbitration had alleged 
that the contract violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Since 
one of the issues to be arbitrated involved a crucial factual 
anti-trust issue, this issue was not a proper subject for arbi-
tration. 
The case of United States v. Ets-Hokin Corporation5 illus-
trates the problem encountered by the parties when they do 
not submit to the arbitrator a stipulated issue for his final 
resolution. California law is the same as federal law insofar 
as grounds for vacating an award are concerned. Under 
section 1286.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one of the 
grounds for setting aside an arbitrator's award is that the 
arbitrator exceeded his authority. How can a court determine 
whether or not an arbitrator, in rendering his award, has 
3. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 5. 284 F.Supp. 471 (D.C. [1966]), 
322 (1968). affd. 397 F.2d 935. 
4. 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. [1968]). 
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exceeded his authority when there is no stipulation as to 
exactly what he is to decide? Because of the difficulty in 
answering this question, it is the practice of many arbitrators, 
when the parties cannot agree in framing the issue, to have 
them stipulate that after hearing the evidence and arguments, 
the arbitrator shall determine the issue and then proceed to 
decide it. Such was not the situation here. However, after 
an extensive discussion of the record of the arbitration pro-
ceedings, the court concluded that the arbitrator did not 
exceed his authority. The court also reiterated the majority 
view that regardless of the degree to which the view of an 
arbitrator on the facts and the law may be open to question, 
a court will not set the award aside for errors either in law 
or in fact. In short, a court will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the arbitrator. 
Repudiation of Breach 
Whether or not an employer had repudiated its breach 
of contract before the employee had changed her position, 
was the issue facing the court in Pichignau v. City of Paris. 6 
It is clear that under California law, a party who has com-
mitted a breach of contract can repudiate the breach and 
thus be liable only for damages between the time of the breach 
and the repudiation of the breach, rather than for the entire 
remainder of the contract. In the Pichignau case, plaintiff 
was employed as a saleslady at I. Magnin's, a leading fashion 
store in San Francisco. She met Madame De Tessan, a 
principal shareholder and chairman of the board of directors 
of City of Paris, a well known San Francisco department 
store. After negotiations, plaintiff entered into a five-year 
contract of employment with City of Paris. Eighteen months 
later, City of Paris terminated the contract. 
It was conceded for purposes of the trial of defendant's 
special defense that defendant had breached the contract. 
The critical issue facing the court was whether defendant 
had repudiated its breach before plaintiff had changed her 
6. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
147 (1968). 
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position. A series of letters were exchanged between the 
parties. Plaintiff was offered re-employment at her former 
salary, but subject to discharge on 15 days' notice and subject 
also to defendant's right to insist that the contract had been 
terminated when plaintiff was first discharged. The court 
pointed out that retraction of breach must be clear and 
unequivocal and that the party who purports to repudiate 
its breach may not impose new conditions not in accord with 
the original contract. 
Damages 
Amerson v. Christman7 involves a somewhat complex sit-
uation in which a number of separate appeals were filed. In 
the lower court, plaintiff homeowner sued defendant con-
tractor for breach of a contract to construct a house. From 
that judgment, which held that the contractor was in breach 
and awarded plaintiff $11,931.62, the homeowner filed two 
appeals and the contractor, one. On the question of damages 
the court reiterated the usual rule that when the contractor 
breaches, the measure of damages is the cost of completion. 
On the question of special damages, plaintiff introduced evi-
dence as to his loss of use of the house and the cost of caring 
for his mother and son. The trial court refused to award 
special damages despite the fact that plaintiff's testimony 
was uncontroverted. The appellate court returned the matter 
to the trial court for an assessment of special damages, after 
quoting section 3300 of the Civil Code. The court also 
refused to find a novation, pointing out the usual requirement 
that a novation involves the substitution of a new obligation 
for an existing one and thus the extinguishment of the old 
contract. 
The problem of awarding loss of profits as part of plaintiff's 
damages resulting from defendant's breach of contract was 
encountered in Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. A.J. Industries, 
Inc. s Defendant owned a gold mine in Juneau, Alaska. Plain-
tiff purchased all the facilities for salvage purposes. When 
7. 261 Cal. App.2d 811, 68 Cal. Rptr. 8. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
378 (1968). 787 (1968). 
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defendant breached, the lower court assessed damages on 
the basis of the difference between the gross price for which 
the materials could have been sold at the nearest market and 
the gross cost to plaintiff for purchasing and dismantling the 
materials and transporting them to the market. The defend-
ant argued for the more familiar measure of damages rule 
applicable to a sale of goods, i.e., the difference between 
contract price and market price. To this argument the appel-
late court replied as follows: "Defendant's breach (repudia-
tion) of the contract prevented plaintiffs from salvaging and 
reselling any of the materials. In the circumstances, the 
court could properly award plaintiffs the loss of anticipated 
profits resulting from defendant's breach."9 
Parol Evidence 
The introduction of parol evidence in cases involving writ-
ten instruments was the subject of several cases. In Masterson 
v. Sine/a Masterson and his wife had conveyed real property 
to Sine and his wife, Masterson's sister. Part of the transaction 
included an option whereby the grantors could repurchase 
the property from the grantees. Thereafter, Masterson was 
adjudged bankrupt. His trustee in bankruptcy and his wife 
brought this action for declaratory relief to establish their 
right to enforce the option. The trial court refused to allow 
the admission of extrinsic evidence offered by the Sines to 
show that the parties wanted the property kept in the Master-
son family and that the option was thus personal to the 
Mastersons and could not be exercised by Mr. Masterson's 
trustee in bankruptcy. The court based the exclusion of such 
testimony on the parol evidence rule. The supreme court, 
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Traynor, held this to 
be error. 
Whether or not the parol evidence rule prevents the intro-
duction of extrinsic evidence depends initially upon whether 
or not the parties to a written contract have agreed to its 
being a complete and final embodiment of the terms of the 
9. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 70 Cal. 10. 68 Cal.2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 
Rptr. at 794. 436 P.2d 561 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1969 571 
15
Meiners: Contracts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Contracts 
contract, i.e., an integration. If they have not, the second 
consideration is whether or not the extrinsic evidence which 
is offered adds to or varies the terms of the written contract. 
If it does not and the writing is not an integration, extrinsic 
evidence may be admitted. 
However, the problem is further complicated by this ques-
tion: how do you determine whether or not the parties 
intended the written contract to be a complete and final 
integration of their transaction? Specifically, do you arrive 
at this determination by examining only the written instrument 
or do you consider the extrinsic evidence and its relevance 
to the writing? The court pointed out that California cases 
have held that whether or not there is an integration must 
be determined solely from the face of the written instrument. 
This rule has not been consistently applied however and the 
requirement that the writing must appear incomplete on its 
face has been repudiated in many other California cases. 
The court noted that in formulating a rule governing parol 
evidence, several policies must be accommodated. One policy 
is based on an assumption that written evidence is more accu-
rate than human memory. Another policy is the fear of 
fraud by interested parties. 
In the opinion of the court, evidence of oral collateral 
agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is 
likely to be misled. Therefore, the rule must be based on the 
credibility of the evidence. One standard is that of section 
240 (1) (b) of the Restatement of Contracts which allows 
evidence of a collateral agreement if it "might naturally be 
made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were 
the parties to the written contract." The Uniform Commer-
cial Code section 2-202 would exclude such evidence in even 
fewer cases. The official comment to this section states, "If 
the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would 
certainly have been included in the document. . then 
evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier 
of fact." 
Applying this reasoning to the case at hand the court pointed 
out that the deed was silent on the question of assignability. 
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The type of instrument was then considered when the court 
reasoned that the difficulty of accommodating the formalized 
structure of a deed to the insertion of collateral agreements 
makes it less likely that all the terms of such an agreement 
were included. The court speculated on reasons why the 
option may have been placed in the deed and concluded 
that this case is one in which it can be said that a collateral 
agreement such as this "might naturally be made as a sepa-
rate agreement" (using the Restatement test). From this, 
the court reasoned, "A fortiori, the case is not one in which 
the parties 'would certainly' have included the collateral agree-
ment"ll (using the V.e.e. test, without pointing out that it 
has no application to a transaction involving real property). 
Thus, the court concluded that the evidence offered to prove 
that the parties agreed that the option was not assignable to 
one other than a person in the Masterson family should have 
been admitted. 
Dissenting, Justice Burke, with whom Justice McComb 
concurred, said that the majority opinion undermines the parol 
evidence rule as it has been known since 1872, renders suspect 
instruments of conveyance absolute on their face, materially 
lessens the reliance which can be placed on written instru-
ments which affect title to realty, and opens the door, albeit 
unintentionally, to a new technique for the defrauding of 
creditors. The majority was also said to have arrived at its 
holding by a series of false premises not supported either in 
the record of this case or in the California cases cited. 
In Houghton v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp.,12 a clause in the 
written contract provided, "In the event the company decides 
to discontinue the plastic [sic] division, you will be guar-
anteed one year's basic salary in advance at time of termi-
nation." Was the employee entitled to the one year's salary 
if the employer transferred the business to another corpora-
tion? Or was he entitled to the salary only if he lost his 
job? (In this case the employee continued his employment 
with no interruption in pay but with a new employer.) Nat-
11. 68 Cal.2d at 228-229, 65 Cal. 12. 261 Cal. App.2d 530, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. at 549, 436 P.2d at 565. Rptr. 43 (1968). 
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urally the plaintiff-employee argued the former premise and 
the defendant-employer, the latter. 
The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence as to the meaning 
of the written provision in the contract. This was held to be 
error and the judgment for plaintiff was reversed. The trial 
court, in accepting defendant's version of the meaning and 
effect of the paragraph quoted above committed reversible 
error because there was no substantial evidence to support 
the interpretation which it adopted. Although the appellate 
court did agree that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to 
show the circumstances under which an agreement was made, 
it pointed out that certain parol evidence concerning what 
the parties intended the meaning of the integration to be, 
cannot be admitted as an aid in interpreting the writing. 
In two cases concerning leases, Beverly Hills Oil Co. v. 
Beverly Hills Unified Sch. District13 and Interpublic Group at 
Companies v. On Mark Engineering CO.,14 involve the usual 
question of whether or not an ambiguity exists in the language 
of a written integration. Obviously, if an ambiguity does 
exist, parol evidence is admissible, since it does not add to or 
vary the terms of the writing. It helps to determine what 
the terms of the writing are. In both cases it was held that 
ambiguity existed in the written integration and that parol 
evidence was thus properly admitted. 
Specific Performance 
In Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn Estates, Inc./5 a 
purchaser under a written agreement for the sale of real 
property sought specific performance of the contract after the 
defendant-seller committed an anticipatory breach. The 
"cardinal issue" was whether or not the plaintiff-purchaser 
was financially ready and able to pay the purchase price 
within the time required by the contract. Plaintiff contended 
that he need only prove an ability to pay the purchase price 
at the time of trial as distinguished from the time required 
13. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 15. 255 Cal. App.2d 526, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 640 (1968). Rptr. 518 (1967). 
14. 381 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. [1967]). 
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under the contract. The court rejected this contention and 
stated that an essential basis for specific performance must 
be a showing of performance, tender of performance, or 
ability and willingness to perform within the time required 
by the contract. If such showing is not made, specific per-
formance will be denied, notwithstanding a breach by the 
seller. 
* 
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